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COUNTERLAND DOCTRINE – AN INTEGRATION HURDLE

by

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A paper submitted to the Faculty of the Naval War College in partial satisfaction of the requirements of the Department of Joint Military Operations.

The contents of this paper reflect my own personal views and are not necessarily endorsed by the Naval War College or the Department of the Navy.

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ABSTRACT

COUNTERLAND DOCTRINE – AN INTEGRATION HURDLE.

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The services of the United States Military have made great progress in developing doctrine that fosters improved integration. Increased communication and cooperation between the services, as well as awareness of key lessons learned during war are to credit for this evolution. Air Force Counterland doctrine is an example of this dedication to developing a fully integrated force.

Counterland doctrine addresses two key mission areas: air interdiction (AI) and close air support (CAS). Recent historical analysis shows that although AI and CAS missions have been effective on the battlefield, AI and CAS do not fully describe the actual employment of air power. Counterland doctrine is inherently flawed and fails in its design to integrate air power with maneuver warfare. The inclusion of the direct attack (DA) mission into counterland doctrine will correct the doctrinal flaw and will help to further define the relationship between air power and maneuver warfare.

COUNTERLAND DOCTRINE – AN INTEGRATION HURDLE

Separate ground, sea and air warfare is gone forever. If ever we should be involved in war, we will fight it in all elements, with all services, as one single concentrated effort

Dwight D. Eisenhower, 1958

Teamwork is an existential part of the American way of life. From the first colonial settlements to the massive national effort harnessed to secure victory in World War II, it was teamwork that captured the best of each American and focused the effort of a few to achieve ultimate success. The future will hold greater challenges than this country has ever faced, and America's very survival may well depend on its time-honored spirit of cooperation. Nowhere is this more crucial than in the joint execution of warfare. As Joint Publication 1 states: "Joint warfare is team warfare."

Great doctrinal strides have been taken to integrate air and land forces. Air Force Doctrine Document 2-1.3, *Counterland* details the Air Force vision of the role of air power in land maneuver warfare. However, *Counterland* is inherently flawed and fails in its design to fully integrate air power with maneuver warfare.

Doctrine

The evolution of modern air-land doctrine provides insight into how the Air Force and the Army have traditionally viewed their own role in warfare, as well as the other service's role. Modern Air Force doctrine, especially as it relates to integration with ground forces in response to the Cold War Soviet threat, was heavily influenced by General Robert J. Dixon. In 1973, while commander of the Air Force's Tactical Air Command (TAC), General Dixon stated "This is a give-and-take business" and that tactical air suppliers "have to know

exactly what the Army wants, and the Army must know what can – and cannot – be done. Close coordination and cooperation must exist and be extended throughout the development, preparation and operations of air and ground components.”¹ General Dixon was the driving force behind the creation of the Air Force’s Red Flag, an annual exercise conducted to develop and perfect Air Force doctrine.²

As the Cold War progressed, the Army also took a keen interest in refining its doctrine, especially as it related to the Soviet threat in Europe. Army General Donn Starry, commander of the Army’s Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) was responsible for updating FM-100-5 *Operations* in 1982, which promulgated the AirLand Battle (ALB) doctrine.³ AirLand Battle focused on the counteroffensive and engagement of second-echelon enemy forces, primarily at the corps level.⁴ In other words, the Army plan would be to defend against the initial Soviet attack, then focus an integrated air and land effort at punching through the lead Soviet echelon. Like the Air Force, the Army established an annual exercise called Red Banner. The services used Red Flag and Red Banner to “observe, evaluate, and quantify air-land battle operations.”⁵

In 1983 the Army and Air Force chiefs of staff endorsed a memorandum of agreement which detailed how each service would cooperate in developing the means with which to apply the AirLand Battle doctrine.⁶ The end result was a list of “thirty-one initiatives,” which addressed such issues as theater air defense, CAS, counter-helicopter tactics, electronic warfare, joint munitions development, command and control (C2), and interdiction.⁷

The “thirty-one initiatives” were instrumental in highlighting some areas of weakness in service cooperation, and are credited with the shaping and development of what later

became known as the E-8 Joint Surveillance Target Attack Radar System (J-STARS), employed for the first time in Operation Desert Storm.⁸ The Air Force, however, continued to revise doctrine beyond AirLand Battle. In its view, it needed to focus not only on the immediate threat to the Army corps, but also the plan for eventual NATO advance. Follow-On Forces Attack (FOFA) doctrine relied heavily on the Strategic Air Command (SAC) and was viewed by many in the Air Force as a more conventional use of air power.⁹ The Army's AirLand Battle doctrine and the Air Force's Follow-On Forces Attack doctrine were not mutually exclusive; however, they represented a gap in understanding that could have dire effects on how a war was fought.¹⁰

The evolution of service doctrine was influenced to a degree by the Defense Reorganization Act of 1986. Sometimes referred to as the Goldwater-Nichols Act after its sponsors, Senator Barry Goldwater and Representative Bill Nichols, the act encouraged formation of new rules that might help the services function with less friction.¹¹ Air Force Doctrine Document 2-1, *Air Warfare* and its subset AFDD 2-1.3, *Counterland*, were created to educate Air Force personnel on policy and in the case of *Counterland*, provide guidance on the use of air power in support of maneuver warfare.¹² The effective employment of U.S. military forces in recent operations such Desert Storm, Enduring Freedom and Iraqi Freedom has received tremendous praise from knowledgeable experts. Lieutenant General Scott Wallace, commander of the U.S. Army's V Corps stated in May, 2003 that the American success in Iraq was due to "the extraordinary power of the combined arms team."¹³ How can Air Force doctrine be flawed if the combined arms team of the U.S. military is so successful? A short anecdote may offer a starting point in the attempt to answer that question.

The “FUBAR” Flight¹⁴

The “flawed doctrine” argument is partially based on the author’s experience during Operation Enduring Freedom in 2002. Reconstruction of one of the author’s flights, in particular, serves to point out not only some doctrinal deficiencies, but also a failure on the part of each service to harmonize their efforts.

During the flight in question, the author was the “section lead” (leader of a “two ship”) of two FA-18s on an XCAS (airborne alert close air support) mission. The flight entered the airspace, refueled and was proceeding to its assigned station. Operation Anaconda, the 1200-man operation mounted against Taliban and al Qaeda forces in the Shah-e-Kot Valley had been over for some time and things had quieted down, at least in the air. Once on station, the flight lead began snapping a few pictures of his wingman against the beautiful backdrop of the Afghanistan desert: more pictures for the post-deployment video that squadron members had been working on.

The photo session was interrupted by an unexpected call from the E-3 Sentry Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS) aircraft which had received a request for CAS support from a small group of American soldiers. The AWACS provided the flight with a vector towards the soldiers’ position and the secure frequency in use by the element. The FA-18s darted off in hopes of doing what all Naval Aviators love to do: something other than “drill holes in the sky.”

The FA-18s made contact with the ground element and received an abbreviated situational update from them. The soldiers had dismounted and were proceeding to a location that had been bombed earlier in the day. Their mission was to inspect the sight for

intelligence, and although they had not made contact with the enemy, they anticipated the possibility of doing so and requested “high cover support” from the FA-18s. The flight gained a “visual” of the friendly ground forces and had “eyes on the objective”.

Maintaining sight of the ground element, the objective, and potential enemy locations was not an easy task. In the midst of it all the FA-18 wingman screamed to his lead: “BREAK RIGHT, BREAK RIGHT.” That transmission prevented the flight lead from colliding with a Predator Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV). After a short, predominately one-sided conversation with the AWACS it became apparent that it too was unaware of the UAV’s presence. The flight lead re-positioned the flight and continued to receive situational updates from the ground element. The communications were so clear that the FA-18 pilots could hear the labored breathing of the soldiers as well as the sound of their boots crunching stones as they made their way towards the objective. Adrenaline was flowing on the ground and in the air.

Unexpectedly, the AWACS contacted the flight and directed it to return to base (RTB). No reason or explanation was provided. The FA-18 lead was perplexed but did what all pilots do when confronted with an order they don’t want to obey: the “stalling maneuver” (not to be confused with a “stall maneuver”). “Say again, you were broken.” AWACS again directed the flight to disengage, this time adding that word from the Combined Air Operations Center (CAOC) was for the FA-18 flight to inform the ground unit that they hadn’t filled out the proper “CAS request paperwork.” The exasperated flight lead replied “tell them yourself, we’re staying.” Unfortunately, the AWACS controller claimed that he had lost the ability to contact the ground force and for a third time directed the FA-18s to RTB. The controller also added that a flight of F-14s on a CAS mission were 45 minutes out

and would support the ground mission if needed at that time. The FA-18s, low on fuel, had no choice but to inform the soldiers of their departure. They then began their long trek home. The only words spoken the entire way were the wingman's profound statement of summary: "FUBAR!"¹⁵

During the long flight back to USS Ship both flight members contemplated the event and tried to make sense of it. The FA-18 lead had recently completed a 28-day temporary assignment in the master air attack plan (MAAP) cell at the CAOC, located at Prince Sultan Air Base, Saudi Arabia. That experience offered him insight into what exactly transpired during the mission. Subsequent communication with the Navy Air Wing Liaison Officer (LNO) serving in the MAAP cell confirmed his suspicions.

Analysis

The MAAP Cell was responsible for assigning available weapons delivery platforms to targets.¹⁶ When targets or target positions were not available prior to finalization of the ATO, the MAAP cell assigned available air assets to AI, CAS, or XCAS missions based on anticipated ground force maneuvers. The information concerning the ground scheme of maneuver was provided by the battlefield coordination detachment (BCD), an Army liaison team provided by the land component commander to the air operations center (AOC). The BCD processed Army requests for air support, monitored and interpreted the land battle situation for the AOC, and provided the necessary interface for exchange of current intelligence and operational data.¹⁷ The MAAP cell was directed to have CAS (or XCAS) aircraft over Afghanistan as close to 24 hours a day as they could manage.¹⁸ The flights were assigned CAS missions if the proper CAS request forms were completed and delivered via the BCD prior to publishing the air tasking order (ATO). Otherwise, flights were assigned the

XCAS mission. The emphasis on the CAS mission may have been an effort to assure the Army that the Air Force was there to support them, especially after Army Major General Franklin L. “Buster” Hagenback, Anaconda’s commander, publicly criticized Air Force fire support operations during the operation.¹⁹ However, one subtlety in the whole process was that any flight labeled as CAS was flown in support of the Combined Forces Land Component Commander (CLFCC), U.S. Army Lieutenant General Mikolashek and could not be re-directed without his approval. Similarly, XCAS missions were under the control of the Combined Forces Air Component Commander (CFACC), U.S. Air Force Lieutenant General Moseley. Thus, the cause of the confusion during the author’s noted flight becomes somewhat understandable. The ground unit may have not submitted a CAS request prior to finalization of the ATO. They may have used a known-good frequency to contact AWACS in an effort to obtain CAS support. The AWACS may have “jumped the gun” in directing the FA-18 flight to support the request for CAS even though their assigned mission was XCAS. Finally, for whatever reason, it may have not been possible to change the mission of the FA-18 flight “real-time” from XCAS (CFACC-controlled) to CAS (CFLCC-controlled).

It must be stated that the author’s experience noted above was not routine, however it does highlight a number of integration problems. Stated bluntly, that particular event offers a seemingly endless supply of “A-grade” theses and points to ponder. What were the military politics of the supported and supporting commanders? What system failed and allowed American soldiers to be placed at greater risk than they needed to be? Why doesn’t anyone in the area of operations ever know the location of the Predator until it almost hits a friendly aircraft? Great questions all, but the real heart of the matter boils down to a flaw in Air Force and Joint doctrine and a lack of clarity when it comes to boundaries.

Counterland

It is in *Counterland* that the first doctrinal hurdle to ground and air force integration is encountered. Air Force Doctrine Document 2-13 *Counterland* is the Air Force vision of how air power can best be used decisively in joint warfare by quickly destroying, or rendering ineffective, significant portions of critical enemy surface forces and their supporting infrastructure, thus enhancing maneuver warfare.²⁰ To do this, *Counterland* addresses two traditional missions – air interdiction (AI) and close air support (CAS). Unfortunately, these two missions do not adequately address current war-fighting practices. Evidence to that fact is only discernable after analysis of the air interdiction and close air support missions.

Counterland – Air Interdiction

The roots of the air interdiction mission lie very near the beginning of the age of aerial warfare. In World War I, General Pershing recommended Colonel Billy Mitchell for promotion to Brigadier General because of Mitchell's raids that facilitated the advance of the ground troops.²¹ During World War II in the three months prior to D-Day, allied bombers shifted their attacks from strategic targets to the German transportation system in France, again slowing the movement of supplies and men.²²

Today, air interdiction is defined as: “Air operations conducted to destroy, neutralize, or delay the enemy’s military potential before it can be brought to bear effectively against friendly forces at such distance from friendly forces that detailed integration of each air mission with the fire and movement of friendly forces is not required.”²³ *Counterland* adds that “A key portion of the air interdiction definition deals with distance.”²⁴ Because air interdiction is employed beyond the range which the enemy ground forces can engage friendly ground forces, the risk of fratricide is reduced and the need for deconfliction

between air maneuver and friendly surface fires is reduced.²⁵ Further, *Counterland* contends that beyond this range “AI has the flexibility to operate in support of surface operations or as the main effort against the enemy ground force.”²⁶ That particular statement contradicts the interdiction mission which is to support ground maneuver warfare. That statement also leaves open the possibility of declaring the Air Force commander the supported commander, which some might consider inappropriate in an area of operations like Afghanistan.

AI missions are categorized as preplanned or nonpreplanned. The former consists of missions that can be conducted against specific targets based on intelligence, and are the predominant type of AI mission flown. Preplanned AI missions, for example, are those executed against revetted enemy tanks beyond the range of friendly forces. Nonpreplanned AI missions are sometimes referred to as “armed reconnaissance” missions and are usually assigned an area vice a particular target, hence the term “Killbox AI.”²⁷ When AI missions are flown in support of ground forces, the targets attacked should be those most important to the ground component commander. For this reason, communication and coordination between the land and air component commanders are essential. The key point to take away from analysis of the air interdiction mission is that the distance from enemy to friendly exceeds the maximum range at which the enemy can affect maneuver of the friendly ground force. This is not the case with close air support.

Counterland – Close Air Support

The close air support mission, although first used in World War I, was refined as a tactic by the German Luftwaffe during the Spanish Civil War from 1936 to 1938 when the German Condor Legion supported the Spanish.²⁸ It may have been this experience with the CAS and AI missions that lead to the development of the Blitzkrieg operations that Germany

employed so well when they drove across Poland and France. The Allies also made extensive use of CAS, although somewhat later in the War. The British Eighth Army and Western Air Force, and later the American Ninth Air Force had incredible success using CAS against the Germans west of Cairo in 1942. Later, General George S. Patton also made extensive use of close air support when his Third Army, supported by the Ninth Air Force, punched across France. Patton placed airmen in his tanks to act as CAS controllers.²⁹

The development of the CAS mission continues today. Joint Publication 3-09.3 *Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Close Air Support (CAS)* is a true testament to the effort by the U.S. military to develop concepts and procedures in order to make the most efficient and effective use of existing forces. The latest version, officially published in September 2003 was used by airmen and soldiers in draft format during Operation Iraqi Freedom in March of that year, a full six months prior to its publication.

The CAS joint publication defines close air support as “air action by fixed-and rotary-wing aircraft against hostile targets that are in close proximity to friendly forces and which require detailed integration of each air mission with the fire and movement of those forces.”³⁰ The obvious distinction between AI and CAS missions is “the requirement for detailed integration because of proximity, fires, or movement.”³¹ The requirement for coordination exists to prevent fratricide and also to ensure that the targets attacked are those that most threaten the position or movement of friendly ground forces. The important point to take away after this brief description of the close air support mission is that proximity and integration are critical elements to the CAS mission.

Counterland – The Deficiency

Armed with an understanding of the origins and current definitions of the two missions addressed in Air Force *Counterland*, examination of recent historical uses of the two sub-missions (CAS and AI) is warranted. This analysis may help point out weak areas in doctrine that make the integration of ground and air forces difficult, if not impossible. Specifically, the question to ask is whether there are holes in the doctrine.

During Operation Allied Force (Kosovo) in mid-1999 coalition air forces attacked military forces and infrastructure for 78 days while flying missions labeled as battlefield air interdiction (BAI) or close air support (CAS). BAI missions were normally conducted against fixed military facilities, while CAS missions were flown against fielded military forces. Additionally, CAS missions were also conducted while under the control of an airborne forward air controller, or FAC(A).³²

There are a number of doctrinal inconsistencies in categorizing the missions mentioned above as BAI or CAS. First, BAI is a term employed by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and does not exist in U.S. Air Force or U.S. joint doctrine. NATO doctrine defines BAI as “air operations to destroy, neutralize or delay the enemy’s military potential before it can be brought to bear effectively against friendly forces at such a distance from friendly forces that detailed integration of each air mission with the fire and movement of friendly forces is not required.”³³ This definition is virtually identical to the AI definition found in *Counterland*, thus one has to ask why BAI missions were apportioned on the Air Tasking Order (ATO) instead of AI missions. The larger issue with the BAI categorization is

the fact that there were no friendly forces on the ground in Kosovo, therefore BAI (or AI) could not have occurred.³⁴

The CAS missions flown in Operation Allied Force also did not meet the joint definition of the mission. Airborne forward air controllers were used to positively identify fielded enemy ground forces, guide precision weapons when required, assess collateral damage potential and to obtain bomb impact assessment (BIA).³⁵ Air controllers, both ground and airborne, are required in the CAS mission as part of the “detailed integration” element and their purpose is to prevent fratricide. The fact that air controllers were used does not make the mission CAS due to the fact that again, there were no friendly ground forces present. “Misuse” of the AI and CAS terms in describing counterland missions was not limited to Allied Force.

Use of air power during Operation Enduring Freedom provides another useful example of this doctrinal inconsistency. Aircraft routinely entered the area of operations having been assigned CAS or XCAS (airborne alert close air support) missions. Numerous times aircraft were re-directed and instructed to attack locations nowhere near the assigned station against targets that were not engaged with friendly forces. By some accounts, 80 percent of the weapons delivered by U.S. Navy tactical air in the opening days were employed in this manner.³⁶ The asymmetric and non-linear battlefield that characterized Enduring Freedom also meant that these enemy forces might never engage friendly forces (unless targeted first) and thus were not an imminent threat. While clearly a testament to the flexibility of modern air power and a precursor to the doctrinal development of time sensitive targeting, these missions cannot be categorized as CAS, XCAS or even AI.

Thus, it would appear that there is indeed a hole in Air Force doctrine; air interdiction and close air support missions do not fully describe the types of operations in which air forces have been recently employed. The key to repairing the hole is to establish a third mission category in counterland doctrine, called direct attack (DA).³⁷ The direct attack mission would include air operations aimed at rendering an enemy's military capability ineffective outside an established land area of operations.³⁸ The addition of the direct attack mission to Air Force doctrine might help to eliminate the supported/supporting question and would refine the role of the CAS and AI missions. DA missions would be supported missions, "owned" and controlled by the CFACC. CAS and AI missions would then operate in support of the CFLCC. The only remaining question would concern the boundary within the area of operations that separates fires.

Who Supports Whom Across What Boundary?

The traditional method of separating fires in an area of operations is through use of the fire support coordination line (FSCL). According to joint doctrine, all air-to-ground and surface-to-surface attack operations short of the FSCL are controlled by the appropriate land or amphibious force commander.³⁹ Long range joint fires beyond the FSCL have traditionally been under the control of the JFACC.⁴⁰ There is no set distance from the forward line of troops (FLOT) or forward edge of the battle area (FEBA) that defines the location of the FSCL; it is up to the land force commander to recommend the placement of the FSCL based on his intended scheme of maneuver and his ground force's ability to apply organic fires in support of that plan. With the Army's increasing ability to employ organic fires at long range, that line could conceivably be extended to such a range that restricts AI missions from affecting enemy forces that could influence the ground scheme of maneuver. Use of the

FSCL can be very effective in traditional types of linear warfare involving well-defined axes of advance. The incongruous, “distributed forces” concept involving smaller, lighter ground units employed over a wide battlefield (e.g., Enduring Freedom), may have made the FSCL obsolete as a fire support coordination measure. Similarly, fire support coordination during Operation Iraqi Freedom was difficult due to the speed at which the friendly forces (and the FSCL) moved forward, as pointed out in the Third Infantry Division (Mechanized) after action report (AAR): “The placement of the FSCL was so far in front of the forward edge of the battlefield (FEBA) that neither divisional nor corps assets could effectively manage the battlespace.”⁴¹ Thus, in such pocketed or speed-oriented ground maneuver schemes, it may well be beyond the capability of airmen and soldiers to maintain situational awareness with respect to the FSCL.

One possible solution may be adoption of the “killbox” concept as the primary means for coordination of fires.⁴² The Killbox reference grid is a geographical reference system established by the CFACC that divides the area of operations into a checkerboard of killboxes, traditionally thirty minutes of longitude by thirty minutes of latitude. It is sometimes further divided into “keypads” that resemble the number configuration on a digital telephone.

During Operation Iraqi Freedom, air operations within a particular killbox were dependent upon the status of the killbox and its location with respect to the FSCL. “Open” killboxes were those in which aircraft could attack targets without direct positive control (e.g., forward air controller). The opposite was true for “closed” killboxes. Short of the FSCL all killboxes were closed unless the CFLCC opened them via the air support operations center (ASOC). Beyond the FSCL, killboxes were open unless closed by the CFACC.⁴³

It has been argued that the primary method for fire support coordination should be changed to the killbox instead of the FSCL, yet historical analysis of OIF proves that both methods were in effect. While that point is true, the issue must be examined from the warfighter's perspective in order to appreciate the value of the proposed system. For the soldier on the ground, visual conception of the FSCL is readily apparent until long-range weapons like the Army's Multiple Launch Rocket System (MLRS) offer the ability to place the FSCL beyond the range that the immediate maneuver scheme requires.⁴⁴ The mere fact that the MLRS can affect the battlespace at greater distances, however, doesn't mean that it can deliver mass effects out to that range. Further, the maximum range of the MLRS may well exceed the range used to define interdiction, the definition of which is rooted in the enemy's ability to influence the friendly scheme of maneuver.

This is where the direct attack mission enters. The DA mission would be tasked with attacking enemy forces beyond the range from which the enemy could influence the friendly scheme of maneuver (i.e., beyond the conventional interdiction definition). In the author's opinion, the method most suited for this dynamic fire support coordination, or the boundary separating DA from AI, is via use of the killbox. Using the killbox as the primary means of fire support coordination relies on effective command and control, as well as coordination between the CFLCC and CFACC. Yet the process of "opening" or "closing" a killbox once effective command and control is in place is much easier than changing the position of the FSCL, which is often difficult for the airman or soldier to visualize when the friendly ground forces advance at a fast rate as they did during Operation Iraqi Freedom. Thus, counterland missions occurring beyond the FSCL would be classified as DA, while those short of the FSCL would be labeled CAS or AI, depending on the coordination required. The status of a

killbox (open or closed) is much easier for an airman to understand “real time,” especially when the alternative is an FSCL that moves with the ground forces along a path of maneuver with which the airman may not be familiar. As stated, coordination between the air and land component commanders is essential to the success of killbox concept.

Measures have already been taken to increase coordination between the land and air component commanders. During Operation Enduring Freedom, U.S. Air Force Lieutenant General Daniel Leaf became the first director of the newly-created air component coordination element (ACCE). “Lieutenant General Leaf was the Joint Forces Air Component Commander’s representative to the land component commander. He worked with the Coalition Forces Air Component Commander to develop the air and space strategy and coordinated close-air-support missions with the Army. General Leaf acted as the coordinating authority between the land and air commanders.”⁴⁵ Essentially, the ACCE is the CFACC’s representative to the CFLCC. Coordination and integration at the general-officer level, in the author’s opinion, is required to make the killbox form of fire support coordination function efficiently.

Recommendations

After having defined the deficiencies in Air Force counterland doctrine, it is argued that the addition of the direct attack mission should be incorporated into AFDD 2-1.3 *Counterland*. Further, the missions of CAS, AI and DA should be specifically spelled out, eliminating confusion concerning supporting/supported roles. Finally, the primary fire support coordination measure should be changed from that of the fire support coordination line to the killbox.

Conclusion

The true test of an operational-level thesis is the ability to answer this question: “Why does the joint force commander care?” In this case, why should he or she care about service doctrine? The answer, of course, is that service doctrine should support joint doctrine. Taken a step further, the joint force command must also be able to adequately define the relationships between his or her supported/supporting commanders and the measures they take to define their battlespace.

In the simplest of terms the author would hope that the joint force commander, upon convening a meeting of his or her planners, might distribute a synopsis of the “FUBAR flight” and say “Make sure this does not happen again.” Life is seldom that simple, however.

When it really comes down to it, doctrine is doctrine. The definitions of CAS and AI found in AFDD 2-1.3 *Counterland* are identical to those found in joint doctrine. That does not mean that the Air Force writes joint doctrine, but at the tactical level aviators train to service doctrine, not joint doctrine. The bottom line is that one small omission or misunderstanding in service or joint doctrine can lead to confusion, distrust and in the worst circumstances dead American soldiers. Ultimately it is the joint force commander’s responsibility, in the true spirit of joint operational warfighting, to ensure that his or her component commanders are not only reading from the same book, but that the book from which they are reading is sound and accurate.

NOTES

¹ Benjamin S. Lambeth, The Transformation of American Air Power (New York: Cornell University Press, 2000), 83.

² Ibid.

³ Ibid.

⁴ Ibid, 86.

⁵ Ibid, 84.

⁶ Ibid.

⁷ Ibid.

⁸ Rebecca Grant, “Hand in Glove,” Air Force Magazine, vol. 86 no.7 (July 2003): 30.

⁹ Lambeth, 87.

¹⁰ Ibid.

¹¹ Ibid, 109.

¹² Air Force Doctrine Document (AFDD) 2-1.3, Counterland, (27 August 1999), v.

¹³ David Anthony Denny, “Wallace Credits Power of Combined Arms for Success in Iraq,” U.S. Department of State International Information Programs, 7 May 2003.
<<http://usinfor.state.gov/topical/pol/terror/texts/03050703.htm>> [1 February 2004].

¹⁴ FUBAR is a common military acronym short for “Fouled Up Beyond All Recognition.”

¹⁵ The flight in question is based on an actual occurrence for which no written documentation exists. Names and callsigns have been omitted to maintain classification levels.

¹⁶ Joint Chiefs of Staff, Command and Control for Joint Air Operations, Joint Pub 3-30 (Washington, DC: 5 June 2003), III-22.

¹⁷ Ibid, B-1.

¹⁸ Based on the author’s experience in the Master Air Attack Plan Cell in the Combined Air Operations Center. Verbal direction not specified in doctrinal writing or theater SOP.

¹⁹ Rebecca Grant, “The Clash About CAS,” Air Force Magazine, vol. 86 no. 1 (January 2003): 54.

²⁰ AFDD 2-1.3, v.

²¹ Alfred F. Hurley, Billy Mitchell, Crusader for Air Power (Indiana University Press, 1975), 36.

²² William Momoyer, Air Power in Three Wars: World War II, Korea, and Vietnam (1978; reprint, Washington D.C.: Office of Air Force History, 1985), 164.

²³ AFDD 2-1.3, 3.

²⁴ Ibid.

²⁵ Ibid.

²⁶ Ibid.

²⁷ Ibid, 27

²⁸ Raymond L. Proctor, Hitler's Luftwaffe in the Spanish Civil War (Greenwood Press, CT 1983), 257.

²⁹ Momyer, 164.

³⁰ Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Doctrine for Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Close Air Support (CAS), Joint Pub 3-09.3 (Washington, DC: 3 September 2003), ix.

³¹ Ibid.

³² Major General David A. Deptula and others, "Direct Attack: Enhancing Counterland Doctrine and Joint Air-Ground Operations," Air and Space Power Journal, Winter 2003, <<http://www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil/airchronicles/apj/apj03/win03/deptula.html>> [19 December 2003].

³³ North Atlantic Treaty Organization, ATP-27C, Air Interdiction and Close Air Support, (Brussels, BE: Military Agency for Standardization, 1999), 2-1

³⁴ Deptula.

³⁵ Deptula.

³⁶ Sandra I. Erwin, "Navy Aviation: Skills Surpass Smart Weapons", National Defense, (October 2002)

³⁷ Deptula.

³⁸ Deptula.

³⁹ JP 3-09.3, III-3.

⁴⁰ Kenneth A. Krogman, Integrating the Joint Force: Improving Coordination Among the Component Commanders (Naval War College, Newport, RI, 16 May 2003), 2.

⁴¹ Third Infantry Division (Mechanized) After Action Report - Operation Iraqi Freedom, July 2003, <<http://www.strategypage.com/articles/3IDAAR/default.asp>> [2 January 2004].

⁴² Deptula.

⁴³ Third Infantry Division (Mechanized) After Action Report.

⁴⁴ Krogman, 2.

⁴⁵ "Opening Remarks of Chairman Jim Saxton," Hearing on C4I Interoperability: New Challenges in 21st Century Warfare, <<http://aremedservices.house.gov/pressreleases/2003/03-10-21saxton.htm>> [20 December 2003].

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